

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM RUFFING	:	
98 Grant Drive	:	
Holland, PA 18966	:	
Plaintiff,	:	CIVIL ACTION
v.	:	No. _____
QUALITY EXPRESS COFFEE &	:	
VENDING SERVICE, INC.	:	
1006 Branagan Drive	:	
Bristol, PA 19007	:	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
and	:	
SCOTT WECHSLER	:	
1006 Branagan Drive	:	
Bristol, PA 19007	:	
and	:	
EDWARD CELIESIUS	:	
1006 Branagan Drive	:	
Bristol, PA 19007	:	
and	:	
STUART AUSTIN	:	
1006 Branagan Drive	:	
Bristol, PA 19007	:	
Defendants.	:	

CIVIL ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby avers as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This action has been initiated by William Ruffing (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff," unless indicated otherwise) for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" - 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, *et. seq.*) and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA" - 43 P. S. §§ 333.101 *et. seq.*). Plaintiff's employer, and each of the above-captioned owners, are personally

liable for failing to pay Plaintiff overtime compensation and knowingly misclassifying him to avoid such state and federal obligations. As a result, Plaintiff seeks damages as set forth herein.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This Court, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because they arise under a federal law - the FLSA. There is supplemental and/or ancillary jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims asserted herein as they arise out of the same common nucleus of operative facts as his federal claims.

3. This Court may properly maintain personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants' contacts with this State and this judicial district are sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants to comply with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, satisfying the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny.

4. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (b)(2), venue is properly laid in this district because all of the acts and/or omissions giving rise to the claims set forth herein occurred in this judicial district.

III. PARTIES

5. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein in their entirety as if set forth in full.

6. Plaintiff is an adult individual, with an address as set forth in the caption.

7. Quality Express Coffee & Vending Service, Inc. ("Defendant QEC") is a commercial coffee delivery service, maker and distributor. Defendant operates from its headquarters in Bristol, Pennsylvania (at the above-captioned address).

8. Scott Wechsler, Edward Celiesius, and Stuart Austin (collectively “Defendant Owners”) are: (a) executives of Defendant QEC; (b) owners of Defendant QEC; (c) daily operations managers of Defendant QEC; and (c) they oversee compensation and the terms and conditions of pay for their respective employees. These owners are being personally sued in their individual capacities and as to their own assets, irrespective of corporate liability.

9. At all times relevant herein, Defendants acted by and through their agents, servants and employees, each of whom acted at all times relevant herein in the course and scope of their employment with and for Defendants.¹

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

10. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein in their entirety as if set forth in full.

11. Defendant QEC is a coffee producer, maker and distributor which has generally had between 15-25 employees depending upon business fluctuation (inclusive of its executive-owners). It’s headquarters and warehouse are located in Bristol, Pennsylvania.

12. Plaintiff was employed with Defendant QEC for approximately 20 years until being furloughed effective on or about April 1, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff was informed of his permanent termination by Defendant QEC on or about September 30, 2020.

13. Because Plaintiff was one of the few employees not returned at age 63 and shortly after requiring various medical accommodations, Plaintiff felt compelled to explore his legal rights as he felt discriminated against as to his termination from employment. While exploring

¹ See e.g. *Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole*, 667 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2012)(managers, owners or and corporate officers exercising control over wages or employee compensation are appropriate defendants under the FLSA and may be individually liable for such violations). The regulations under state law are the same.

his health and age discrimination concerns, Plaintiff learned that Defendants had been unlawfully failing to pay him overtime compensation (prompting the instant lawsuit).

14. There is simply no viable argument that Plaintiff could plausibly meet any exemption under state or federal overtime laws. Plaintiff had been paid a salary of \$2,210.00 on a bi-weekly basis (or in other words, payroll in that gross sum every 2 weeks). And Defendant Owners who managed Plaintiff daily and oversaw his compensation, did at times refer to Plaintiff as a “manager.” But Plaintiff *never met and could not have* met any “executive” exemption to be precluded from overtime compensation.

15. State and federal laws do exempt employees who meet the “executive” exemption from overtime entitlements. To meet such an exemption, the employee must be: (a) paid qualifying salary; and (b) perform “primary duties” that are executive management in nature. *See* 29 C.F.R. 541.100. More specifically, “an exempt ‘executive’ is any employee:”

(1) Compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than \$455 per week
. . . ;

(2) *Whose primary duty is management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof;*

(3) *Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees; and*

(4) *Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees . . .*

See Hickton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. (In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig.), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101095, at *66 (W.D. Pa. 2012), citing, 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a).

16. While Plaintiff was paid a qualifying salary, he never performed “primary duties” of executive management. Plaintiff’s typical workday consisted of the following:

- (A) He generally made at least 200-300 telephone calls per day, every day. The calls consisted of him calling delis, convenience stores, and customers. Plaintiff repeated the same opening dialogue with every customer, “This is Bill from [Defendant]” . . . checking to see if you want / need to order coffee.
- (B) Plaintiff would document whatever order a customer desired to make and perform data entry entering the order in Defendants’ computer system.
- (C) After taking every possible new order, Plaintiff pulled product from shelves, stocked skids, and got everything ready for truck drivers to load the products onto trucks.
- (D) When new products were delivered from vendors, Plaintiff unloaded the trucks at least twice per week.
- (E) The balance of Plaintiff’s duties required him to spend a large part of his day packing boxes to ship orders (such as through UPS) and then getting them ready for shipping to customers.

17. Although at times referred to at times as a “manager,” Plaintiff did not:

- (A) Hire anyone;
- (B) Discipline anyone;
- (C) Evaluate anyone;
- (D) Terminate anyone;
- (E) Give pay increases or compensation;
- (F) Create, draft, or prepare company policies;
- (G) Approve or disapprove of requested vacation, PTO, or any other time off; or
- (H) Have any authority to sign contracts with vendors or other third parties for products or services.

18. The undeniable reality is Defendants called Plaintiff a “manager” on occasion and paid him a salary to knowingly exploit him because unfortunately the majority of blue-collar

workers (and laborers) have the common misunderstanding or misperception that if they are paid a salary, they must not be entitled to overtime pay.

19. The primary duties of Plaintiff's job entailed him providing manual labor of loading, unloading, packing, stocking, and picking orders. Plaintiff was a laborer for Defendants.²

20. The additional primary duties of Plaintiff's job entailed him making hundreds of calls to customers to take new orders. This was pure clerical and data-entry work. To the extent that Defendants attempted to even feign Plaintiff's routine, redundant order-taking could even rise to the level of sales work, it would still be non-exempt work performance.³

21. Plaintiff was a telephone order-taker and laborer, period. To the extent that Plaintiff answered questions of drivers or was contacted while they were on routes at times as a negligible aspect of his job – such duties are also totally non-exempt.⁴ In fact, Plaintiff was able

² See e.g. *Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.*, 551 F.3d 1233, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008)(affirming \$35,000,000 verdict against the defendant because a class of store managers performed primary duties of non-management including stocking, cashier work, etc...); *Hickton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. (In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig.)*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136252 (W.D. Pa. 2012)(denying summary judgment and explaining a jury could readily conclude employee titled "manager" who performed mostly sales and other labor had "primary duties" other than management); *Marshall v. Coastal Group Management*, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11704 (D.N.J. 1980)(reaffirming the denial of summary judgment as to managers explaining they spent most of their time prepping food, cooking, handling customers, working the cash register and cleaning finding assertions of the "executive exemption" to be "untenable").

³ *Hickton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. (In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig.)*, 2056, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101095, at *72 (W.D. Pa. 2012)(any work performed from an employer's workplace in sales is inside sales and clearly non-exempt under the FLSA; and moreover, making calls throughout the day is not an exempt managerial duty under 29 C.F.R. § 541.102).

⁴ Even full-time workplace route dispatchers are well known to work in non-exempt roles. See *Marshall v. National Freight, Inc.*, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9989 (D.N.J. 1979)(dispatcher cannot meet executive exemption and held not to meet administrative exemption); *Sehie v. City of Aurora*, 432 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2005)(summary judgment granted for dispatcher as to FLSA claims); *Iaria v. Metro Fuel Oil Corp.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6844 (E.D. N.Y. 2009); *Alvarez v. Key Transp. Transp. Svc. Corp.*, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2008); *Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles*, 420 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005)(dispatcher is clearly not exempt from overtime requirements).

to perform his entire job remotely when he was on various medical leaves further evidencing his non-executive role.

22. Referring to Plaintiff occasionally as a “manager” was an intentional, knowing, and fraudulent attempt on the part of Defendant Owners to evade state and federal overtime obligations. Plaintiff’s title occasionally stated by Defendants lacks any relevance whatsoever under applicable law(s).⁵

23. As a matter of fact, and law, Defendants are unable to set forth any contrary facts that Plaintiff could plausibly be construed to meet an “executive exemption” under state or federal laws.⁶

24. Plaintiff averaged working 50-55 hours per week for Defendants throughout his tenure until the Covid-19 pandemic commencing in the February-April 2020 timeframe (wherein his overtime gradually decreased).

⁵ See 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 Job titles insufficient: “**A job title alone is insufficient to establish the exempt status** of an employee. The exempt or nonexempt status of any particular employee must be determined on the basis of whether the employee’s salary **and duties meet the requirements of the regulations in this part**.” (Emphasis added). See also *Marshall v. Nat'l Freight, Inc.*, 1979 WL 1977, at *10 (D.N.J. 1979)(explaining that although accounts payable supervisor had a complex and laborious job, he was non-exempt because the majority percentages of his daily duties involved processing transactions and document review pursuant to company guidelines); *Shultz v. A.E. Burgess Co.*, 1970 WL 668, at *4 (N.D. Ala. 1970)(field office manager was non-exempt under FLSA because the majority of his time was spent on non-exempt duties); *Roberts v. Nat'l Autotech, Inc.*, 192 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (N.D. Tex. 2002)(granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, a store manager, because the majority of his time was spent doing non-exempt types of job duties making the managerial or administrative exemptions inapplicable under the FLSA); *Oliva v. Infinite Energy Inc.*, 2012 WL 11868265, at *8-9 (N.D. Fla. 2012)(granting summary judgment to delinquent account overseers because the majority of their job was calling upon debtors and collecting documents which are non-exempt duties, making that their "primary duty").

⁶ The FLSA exempts from its overtime provisions "any 'employee in a **bona fide** executive . . . capacity.'" *Soehnle v. Hess Corp.*, 399 F. App'x 749, 750 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010)(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)). In light of the broad remedial purpose of the FLSA, exemptions are narrowly construed against the employer. *Madison v. Resources for Human Dev., Inc.*, 233 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff could not qualify as an executive under any national jurisprudence interpreting the FLSA, particularly in light of such exemptions being so narrowly construed against employers.

25. State and federal laws permit Plaintiff to recover unpaid overtime for a period of 3 years. Plaintiff's 3-year lookback is therefore from October 15, 2017 through October 15, 2020. Because Plaintiff did not work after April 1, 2020, his 3-year look-back period includes 128 weeks.

26. Defendant only identified that Plaintiff worked for "80.00" hours on every bi-weekly payroll check, regardless of Plaintiff working 100-110 hours per payroll period.

27. Plaintiff's overtime rate should have been (at time and one half), at least \$41.50 per hour. Even assuming Plaintiff only worked an average of 10 hours of overtime per week, in a 128-week lookback, Plaintiff would be owed over \$53,000.00. And this is a baseline, as Plaintiff often worked in excess of 10 hours per week of overtime.

28. Consistent with Defendants' unlawful classification of Plaintiff as an exempt employee, Defendants made no effort to abide by local, state or federal laws mandating employee recordkeeping as to hours or days worked.⁷

29. Plaintiff is *automatically* entitled to liquidated damages for Defendants' actions as outlined in this Complaint, entitling him to over \$100,000.00 in unpaid overtime alone.⁸ Such

⁷ The failure of an employer to abide by mandatory record-keeping of hours worked by an employee violates 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). As a result, an employer's estimates of hours typically worked may be accepted as an employee should not be prejudiced by an employer's failure to follow legal obligations. *See e.g. Zeng Liu v. Jen Chu Fashion Corp.*, 2004 WL 33412, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

damages are in addition to mandatory legal fees and other applicable damages under state and federal law(s). *See* 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)(a) prevailing plaintiff “shall” be entitled to attorney’s fees).

Count I
Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
(Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation)
- Against All Defendants -

30. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein in their entirety as if set forth in full.

31. Plaintiff was not properly paid for all owed overtime as explained *supra*. And such actions constitute violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

Count II
Violations of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”)
(Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation)
- Against All Defendants -

32. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein in their entirety as if set forth in full.

⁸ See e.g. *Solis v. Min Fang Yang*, 345 Fed. Appx. 35 (6th Cir. 2009)(Affirming award of liquidated damages explaining “under the Act, liquidated damages are compensation, not a penalty or punishment, and no special showing is necessary for the awarding of such damages. Rather, they are considered the norm and have even been referred to by this court as mandatory.”); *Gayle v. Harry’s Nurses Registry, Inc.*, 594 Fed. Appx. 714, 718 (2d Cir. 2014)(Affirming award of liquidated damages explaining there is an automatic “presumption” of liquidated damages and “double damages are the norm, single damages the exception,” as the burden to avoid liquidated damages is a “difficult burden.”); *Haro v. City of Los Angeles*, 745 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2014)(Affirming award of liquidated damages explaining they are the “norm” and “mandatory” unless the employer can establish the very “difficult burden” of subjective and objective attempts at FLSA compliance); *Chao v. Barbeque Ventures, LLC*, 547 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir. 2008)(Affirming award of liquidated damages explaining that the employer mistakenly argues its non-compliance was not willful, misunderstanding the high burden to show affirmative steps of attempted compliance and research of the FLSA and separately that its diligence and belief in non-payment of overtime was also objectively reasonable.); *Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc.*, 493 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2007)(Affirming award of liquidated damages explaining that they will always be considered the “norm” in FLSA cases); *Lockwood v. Prince George’s County*, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15302 (4th Cir. 2000)(Affirming award of liquidated damages explaining they are the “norm” and that an employer may not take an ostrich-like approach and refuse to research its obligations under the FLSA and to objectively explain why it failed to comply with the FLSA); *Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd.*, 176 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 1999)(Reversing the district court for not awarding liquidated damages, as doubling unpaid overtime is the rule, not an exception); *Nero v. Industrial Molding Corp.*, 167 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1999)(Affirming award of liquidated damages, as there is a presumption of entitlement to liquidated damages which are the norm).

33. Plaintiff was not properly paid for all owed overtime as explained *supra*. And such actions constitute violations of the PMWA.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court enter an Order providing that:

- A. Defendants are to promulgate and adhere to a policy prohibiting overtime and wage violations;
- B. Defendants are to compensate Plaintiff, reimburse Plaintiff, and make Plaintiff whole for any and all pay and benefits Plaintiff would have received had it not been for Defendants' wrongful actions, including but not limited to all owed wages, overtime, past and future lost earnings, benefits, pension or other employee perks, and other applicable compensation;
- C. Plaintiff is to be awarded actual damages to which he is equitably or legally entitled beyond those already specified herein;
- D. Plaintiff is to be awarded liquidated damages as permitted by applicable laws;
- E. Plaintiff is to be accorded other equitable relief as the Court deems just, proper, and appropriate;
- F. Plaintiff is to be awarded the costs and expenses of this action and a reasonable attorney's fees if permitted by applicable law; and
- G. Plaintiff is permitted to have a trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted,

KARPE, KARPF & CERUTTI, P.C.



Ari R. Karpf, Esquire
3331 Street Road
Building 2, Suite 128
Bensalem, PA 19020

Dated: October 15, 2020

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIACASE MANAGEMENT TRACK DESIGNATION FORM

William Ruffing

CIVIL ACTION

v.

Quality Express Coffee & Vending Service, Inc., et al.

NO.

In accordance with the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan of this court, counsel for plaintiff shall complete a Case Management Track Designation Form in all civil cases at the time of filing the complaint and serve a copy on all defendants. (See § 1:03 of the plan set forth on the reverse side of this form.) In the event that a defendant does not agree with the plaintiff regarding said designation, that defendant shall, with its first appearance, submit to the clerk of court and serve on the plaintiff and all other parties, a Case Management Track Designation Form specifying the track to which that defendant believes the case should be assigned.

SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CASE MANAGEMENT TRACKS:

(a) Habeas Corpus – Cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through § 2255. ()

(b) Social Security – Cases requesting review of a decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying plaintiff Social Security Benefits. ()


(c) Arbitration – Cases required to be designated for arbitration under Local Civil Rule 53.2. ()

(d) Asbestos – Cases involving claims for personal injury or property damage from exposure to asbestos. ()

(e) Special Management – Cases that do not fall into tracks (a) through (d) that are commonly referred to as complex and that need special or intense management by the court. (See reverse side of this form for a detailed explanation of special management cases.) ()

(f) Standard Management – Cases that do not fall into any one of the other tracks. (X)

10/15/2020
Date
(215) 639-0801



Attorney-at-law
(215) 639-4970

Plaintiff
Attorney for
akarpf@karpf-law.com

Telephone

FAX Number

E-Mail Address

DESIGNATION FORM

(to be used by counsel or pro se plaintiff to indicate the category of the case for the purpose of assignment to the appropriate calendar)

Address of Plaintiff: 98 Grant Drive, Holland, PA 18966

Address of Defendant: 1006 Branagan Drive, Bristol, PA 19007

Place of Accident, Incident or Transaction: Defendants place of business

RELATED CASE, IF ANY:


Case Number: _____ Judge: _____ Date Terminated: _____

Civil cases are deemed related when **Yes** is answered to any of the following questions:

1. Is this case related to property included in an earlier numbered suit pending or within one year previously terminated action in this court?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. Does this case involve the same issue of fact or grow out of the same transaction as a prior suit pending or within one year previously terminated action in this court?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. Does this case involve the validity or infringement of a patent already in suit or any earlier numbered case pending or within one year previously terminated action of this court?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. Is this case a second or successive habeas corpus, social security appeal, or pro se civil rights case filed by the same individual?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

I certify that, to my knowledge, the within case is / is not related to any case now pending or within one year previously terminated action in this court except as noted above.

DATE: 10/15/2020


Attorney-at-Law / Pro Se Plaintiff

ARK2484 / 91538

Attorney I.D. # (if applicable)

CIVIL: (Place a ✓ in one category only)

A. Federal Question Cases:

- 1. Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts
- 2. FELA
- 3. Jones Act-Personal Injury
- 4. Antitrust
- 5. Patent
- 6. Labor-Management Relations
- 7. Civil Rights
- 8. Habeas Corpus
- 9. Securities Act(s) Cases
- 10. Social Security Review Cases
- 11. All other Federal Question Cases
(Please specify): _____

B. Diversity Jurisdiction Cases:


- 1. Insurance Contract and Other Contracts
- 2. Airplane Personal Injury
- 3. Assault, Defamation
- 4. Marine Personal Injury
- 5. Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
- 6. Other Personal Injury (Please specify): _____
- 7. Products Liability
- 8. Products Liability – Asbestos
- 9. All other Diversity Cases
(Please specify): _____

I, Ari R. Karp, counsel of record or pro se plaintiff, do hereby certify:

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 53.2, § 3(c) (2), that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the damages recoverable in this civil action case exceed the sum of \$150,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs:

Relief other than monetary damages is sought.

DATE: 10/15/2020


Attorney-at-Law / Pro Se Plaintiff

ARK2484 / 91538

Attorney I.D. # (if applicable)

NOTE: A trial de novo will be a trial by jury only if there has been compliance with F.R.C.P. 38.

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

RUFFING, WILLIAM

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Bucks
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Karpf, Karpf & Cerutti, P.C.; 3331 Street Road, Two Greenwood Square, Suite 128, Bensalem, PA 19020; (215) 639-0801; akarpf@karpf-law.com

DEFENDANTS

QUALITY EXPRESS COFFEE & VENDING SERVICE, INC., ET AL

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant Bucks
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
2 U.S. Government Defendant	<input type="checkbox"/> 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)
(For Diversity Cases Only)

	PTF	DEF		PTF	DEF
Citizen of This State	1	1	Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State	4	4
Citizen of Another State	2	2	Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State	5	5
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	3	3	Foreign Nation	6	6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions](#).

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES
<input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance	PERSONAL INJURY	PERSONAL INJURY	<input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158	<input type="checkbox"/> 375 False Claims Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine	310 Airplane	365 Personal Injury - Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157	<input type="checkbox"/> 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a))
<input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act	315 Airplane Product Liability	367 Health Care/ Pharmaceutical Personal Injury	PROPERTY RIGHTS	<input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment
<input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument	320 Assault, Libel & Slander	330 Federal Employers' Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights	<input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust
<input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment	330 Federal Employers' Liability	368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent	<input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking
<input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act	340 Marine	345 Marine Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 835 Patent - Abbreviated New Drug Application	<input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce
<input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans)	345 Marine Product Liability	PERSONAL PROPERTY	<input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark	<input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation
<input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits	350 Motor Vehicle	370 Other Fraud	SOCIAL SECURITY	<input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
<input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits	355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability	371 Truth in Lending	<input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff)	<input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit
<input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract	360 Other Personal Injury	380 Other Personal Property Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923)	<input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Sat TV
<input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability	362 Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice	385 Property Damage Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))	<input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/ Exchange
<input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise			<input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI	<input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions
REAL PROPERTY	CIVIL RIGHTS	PRISONER PETITIONS	<input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g))	<input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts
<input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation	<input type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights	Habeas Corpus:		<input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters
<input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure	<input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting	463 Alien Detainee	FEDERAL TAX SUITS	<input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment	<input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment	510 Motions to Vacate Sentence	<input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant)	<input type="checkbox"/> 896 Arbitration
<input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land	443 Housing/ Accommodations	530 General	<input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	<input type="checkbox"/> 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
<input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability	445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment	535 Death Penalty		<input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
<input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property	446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other	Other:		
	448 Education	540 Mandamus & Other		
		550 Civil Rights		
		555 Prison Condition		
		560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement		

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 Original Proceeding	<input type="checkbox"/> 2 Removed from State Court	<input type="checkbox"/> 3 Remanded from Appellate Court	<input type="checkbox"/> 4 Reinstated or Reopened	<input type="checkbox"/> 5 Transferred from Another District (specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer	<input type="checkbox"/> 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File
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Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
FLSA (29USC201)

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Brief description of cause:
Violations of the FLSA and the PA Minimum Wage Act.

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION
UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND \$

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions):

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE 10/15/2020

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY-OF-RECORD

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT #

AMOUNT

APPLYING IFFP

JUDGE

MAG. JUDGE

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